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Hartmann: Milwaukee Parental Choice

CLEANING UP WITH BANQUO'S GHOST IN THE DAIRYLAND?
A BRIEF (ECONOMIC) ANALYSIS OF THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL
CHOICE PROGRAM'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONINGOF ITS
AID ON AN EFFECTIVE WAIVER OF A RECIPIENT'S FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION: PROFESSOR RICHARD A. EPSTEIN'S BARGAINING
WITH THE STATE AND MILLER V. BENSON
by
MICHAEL E. HARTMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
University of Chicago Law Professor Richard Epstein's seminal 1985 book Tak-

ings' championed the libertarian notion of the U.S. Constitution's fifth-amendment
takings clause2 as a bulwark against all sorts of state intrusions on individual liberty,
including most forms of regulation and social-welfare programs? This government
activity, Epstein convincingly argued, literally and constitutionally "takes" too much
from private individuals for the supposed public good to go uncompensated. Abold and
stark position, this. Epstein's recent Bargaining with the State4 promotes an admittedly

* Resident public-policy research fellow, Wisconsin Policy Research Institute (W.P.R.L), Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin; assistant editor, WI: WISCONSIN INTEREST: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS AND REFORM [hereinafter WIS. INTRST.J
WP.R.L J.D., University of Minnesota, 1993; B.A. (political science), University of Minnesota, 1990.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
2 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
"Indeed, given the limits the Founders placed on government [including the takings clause], it is difficult to
understand how anyone could argue the Constitution authorizes the kind of expansive government we have today."
Roger Pilon, Freedom,Responsibility and the Constitution: On Recovering OurFounding Principles,in MARKET
LIBERALISM: A PARADIGM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 21, 28 (David Boaz & Edward H. Crane eds. 1993).
'The book, according to Epstein, essentially continues "a project that in spite of the best intentions of its author, has
been in the making now for twenty years," RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WrTH THE STATE xi. xiv (1993).
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, BARGAINING] and was borne of his article, Epstein, Foreword: UnconstitutionalConditions,
State Power,and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L REV. 4 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein. Foreword], EPSTEIN,
BARGAINING, supra,at xiv.
See Richard A. Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditionsand Bargaining Breakdown, 26 SAN DIEGO L REV. 189
(1989) [hereinafter, Epstein, BargainingBreakdown], (from Panel on Unconstitutional Conditions, Annual Meeting
of the American Association of Law Schools, 1989). Contra Howard Abrams, EconomicAnalysis and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Reply to ProfessorEpstein, 27 SAN DIEGO L REV. 359 (1990); but see Richard A. Epstein,
UnconstitutionalConditionsObscured: A BriefResponse to ProfessorAbrams,27 SAN DIEGO L REV. 395 (1990).
See alsoWilliam P.Marshall, Towards aNonurifying Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions: The Example ofthe
Religion Clauses,26 SAN DIEGO L REv. 243 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, UnconstitutionalConditions: Unrecognized Implicationsfor the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L REV. 255 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
UnconstitutionalConditions and the Distributionof Liberty,26 SAN DIEGO L REV. 327 (1989).
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second-bestO corollary notion, long traceable in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, of
what the libertarian response should be to government activity that"gives" aid to private
individuals for the perceived public good: ifthe state gives such aid, it must not attach
conditions that coerce, pressure, or induce an individual to in return waive any of his or
her constitutional rights. The state cannot "bargain" that way.
Ifa state gives school-choice aid to individual parents, for instance, can it constitutionally attach a condition coercing, pressuring, or inducing such a parent to in return
effectively waive the free exercise of religion by preventing the use of that aid - by,
again, an individual- for tuition at a sectarian school? A pending federal lawsuit by
Kansas City's Landmark Legal Foundation on behalf of five low-income parents and
their children essentially asks this question of Wisconsin's four-year-old Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program (M.P.C.P.), as does this short piece.' The following section,
then, by way of further introduction, encapsulizes law professor/economist Epstein's
interpretation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions7 and briefly summarizes the
M.EC.P Section II1 equally briefly describes cases from other, similar contexts in
which the Courthas relied onthe doctrine, 9 and applies Epstein's interpretationto them,'0
then to the more-specific contexts of education-funding, and finally to the M.P.C.P. in
particular, the conclusion is § IV. 2

"One gets the sense that Epstein is not very pleased to be writing this book, which lacks the ringing conclusions
of its illustrious predecessor [EPSTEIN, supranote I]." Ellen Frankel Paul, Dealingwith the Devil, REASON, Mar.
1994, at 59,60 (reviewing RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, BARGAINING Wrr ThE STATE). "Both [Epstein's] libertarian
admirers and his mainstream detractors may be surprised by his relatively pragmatic tone." Daniel Farber, With
Libertyfor Some: A scholarponders how and why the Constitutionlimits conditionson Government benefits, N.Y.
TIMES BOOK REV., Feb. 13,1994, at 28 (reviewing RICHARD A. EPsIuN, BARGAINING WrIT THE STATE). See
iufra note 22 and note 47 and accompanying text.
' See Compaint, Miller v. Benson, No. 93-C-1063 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30,1993). The case has been assigned to Judge
John W. Reynolds. The named defendent is John T. Benson, the state Superintendant of Public Instruction. Id.
Lankmark played a role in successfully defending the school-choice program against previous state constitutional
attacks. See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992) (the M.P.C.P. complies with Wisconsin's public-purpose
doctrine); Davis v. Grover, 464 N.W.2d 220 (Wis. CL App. 1990) rev'd, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). (Both
Landmark and Wisconsin Policy Research Institute have been awarded grants for general operating expenses from
The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation in Milwarkee. See REPoRT OF THE LYNDE AND HARRY BRADLEY
FOUNDATION: AUGUST, 1990- DECM BER, 1992 40,67 (1993)).
'See infra§ ILA. (notes 13-48 and accompanying text).
* See infra § ILB. (not 49-68 and accompanying text).
'See infra § ILA. (notes 74-92 and accompanying text).
'o See infra noes 113-17 and accompanying text.
See nfa § IILB.2.a. (notes 118-33 and accompanying text).
See bnfra § IV (notes 134-40 and accompanying text).
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H. OF MOPS AND THE MILWAUKEE SCHOOL-CHOICE PLAN

A. If.

..,Then...

: The Doctrineof UnconstitutionalConditions

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions recognizes that

the government... may be able to withhold certainbenefits absolutely from
a person, or it may be able to confer those benefits to a person unconditionally. Although it is possible for the government to adopt either of these two
extreme positions, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions nonetheless
insists that the state is not entitled to take certain intermediate positions,

whereby it conditions the transfer it makes upon the individual waiver of
3
constitutional rights.'

The state cannot bargain like that. This doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, unlike
the highly weakened takings clause, is not in the Constitution itself, but then neither is
the atleast equally highly strengthenedstate"police power"by which property is so often
taken. 4 "It roams about constitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases,
'L5
but not in others."

The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine - the basic premise of which, according
to another legal scholar, enjoys overwhelming consensus

6-

reflects the triumph of the view thatgovernment may not do indirectly what
it may not do directly over the view that the greater power to deny a benefit
YEPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 5; see Epstein, Foreword,supranote 4, at 6-7; Richard A. Epstein, No
New Property,56 BROOK. L.REv. 747,762 (1990) ("[While the state may decide to remove the entire system of
support at its free will and pleasure, it does not have a similar degree of freedom with respect to benefits paid to any
individual under the system."). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Why the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine isan
Anachronism (With ParticularReferenceto Religion, Speech, andAbortion), 70 B.U.L. REV. 593,593-94 n.2 (1990)
("Mhe doctrine holds that although government may choose not to provide certain benefits altogether, it may not
condition the conferral of a benefit, once provided, on a beneficiary's waiver of a constitutional right.") (emphasis
added) (citing LAuRENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsnTIuoNAL LAW § 10-8, at 681 & n.29 (2d ed. 1988)).
" EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 9; Epstein, Foreword,supra note 4, at 10.
SEPMEN, BARGAINING, supranote 4, at 9; Epstein, Foreword,supra note 4, at 10-11. "It has been used as an aid
in construing the scope of Congress' spending power and of the states' police power. It has been engrafted onto
substantive protections afforded to speech, religion,and property. It also has found expression in decisions underthe
equal protection and due process clauses." EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted;
emphasis added); Epstein, Foreword,supranote 4, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). (In Macbeth recall, from somewhere - Banquo was murdered by Macbeth. In the next scene, Banquo's ghost shows up at a banquet,
seen only by Macbeth. Macbeth "addresses the apparition and is in danger of exposing [Macbeth's] crimes completely.... Banquo's murder - Macbeth's final success - has brought about his undoing." CLFF'S NOTES ON
SHAKESPARE'S MACBETH 35 (1960).
1,See Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L REv. 1415, 1415 n.1 (1989). See also
Sullivan, supra note 4, at 327.
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includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt. Consensus
that the better view won, however, has not put an end to confusion about
7
its application.
The doctrine has been, writes yet another legal scholar who wants it abandoned, 8 "an
awkward and never fully explicated effort to protect constitutional rights in [the] dramatically different institutional environment" of "the modem regulatory state."' 9 According to a fourth legal scholar, "Despite wide acknowledgement of the doctrine's
importance in modem constitutional law, attempts to explain how it arises or what it does
have been largely unsuccessful. ***[I]n cases involving public assistance benefits ...
[tihe Court has provided no coherent explication of when and how it will apply the
doctrine .... 'm
"ITihe unconstitutional conditions doctrine," writes the scholar who thought its
basic premise enjoyed overwhelming consensus, "is a doctrine in search of a theory."2'
1. In Search of: The Maximization of Social Surplus
"ITihe Pareto principle for measuring social welfare," however, seemingly "makes
it unnecessary to adopt any doctrine of unconstitutional conditions," much less a theory
to support the doctrine, writesEpstein," before providing a theory to supportit. The strict
Pareto test allows every self-interested person (everyone) to compare his or her own
private welfare before and after any transaction or legal change: if no person inposttransactionlegal change State A is worse off than he was at the pre-transaction/legal
change State B baseline, and at least one person is better off in State Athan he was in the
State B baseline, then State A must be judged as superior to State B.2 State A is Pareto
optimal. If the government is considered such a self-interested person, and one of its
7

1

Sullivansupranote 16,at 1415. See alsoCAsSR. SUNSTEINTmE PAMtIALCoNSTITtfON29l (1993);Sunstein,

supra note 13. at 593-94.
11SUNSTEIN, supranote 17, at 292; Sunstein, supra note 13, at 594.
19
SUNSrEIN, supranote 17, at 292; Sunstein,supranote 13,at 594. "The unconstitutional conditics doctrinecannot,
It is far too crude and general a way to address the multiple possible
in short, do much of the work expected of it.
collisions between constitutional protections and the modem regulatory state." Sunstein, supranote 4. at 338. "The
doctrine grows out of the same ideas about neutrality and action that predated the New Deal, and it is hopelessly ill
suited to modern govemmat" SuNSrmN, supranote 17,at 292.
Lynn A. Baker, The PricesofRights: Towarda Positive Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions,75 CORNELL L
REV. 1185, 1186-87 (1990).
21

Sullivan, supra note 4,at 327.

22

EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4. at 8. The principle is named after Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo

Pareto (1848-1923), who developed it.
See Paul, supra note 5, at 60 (While the opening, theoretical chapters of Takings combined a natural-tights
principle with a utilitarian, social-surplus maximization principle, Bargainingjettisons natural rights and fully

embraces the law-and-economics paradigm of Pareto superiority, wealth maximization, prisoner's dilemma games,
transaction costs, strategic bargaining, and externalities.").
' See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4,at 8.
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proposed legal changes is rejected, "then it will be no worse off than before;"' if accepted, "then it will be better off.' 5 "In both cases the stringent Pareto conditions are
satisfied so that there is no reason to worry about the terms and conditions that the
government attaches to its" ' legal changes. The test has nothing to say about the
allocationordistribution ofany "surplus" entrsted to the government by individuals almost always, of course, through some form(s) of taxation-to support its performance
of the tasks designated to it by them cooperatively and collectively." It has something
to say only about the maximization of this social surplus.
The just-compensation requirement, detailed in Takings,18 "preserves a sense of
fairness across parties that is captured in the Paretian formula" by forcing those who
are better off in a post-legal change State A, those who have gained from the change, to

justly (and fully) compensate those who are worse off after the change, those who have
been deprived in some way by it.30
The requirement ensures that no single individual or
faction bears the cost of a particular government action said to be for the universal
common good 31 -most probably, of course, said so by those better offafterthe change.'
Just compensation "also has a clear economic function: to keep the government from
undertaking foolish projects (i.e., those that cause more harm than they do good). It does
this by the simple constitutional expedient ofmaking the government show that there are
no individual losers." 33 Like the Pareto test, the requirement has something to say only
about the maximization of any surplus entrusted to the government for designated
tasks,' nothing about its subsequent allocation or distribution.
"How then should surplus be maximized?... To develop a rule that allows the
transaction" - or, if one of the parties is a government, the legal change - "to go
forward so long as no one is left worse off and someone is made better off will satisfy
all the concerns of the just compensation requirement and the strict rules of Pareto
optimality on which it rests."3' Under a rule like this, it would seem to still be possible
for a government with the greater power to deny a benefit to exercise the lesser power

SId. at 9.

2 Id.
26 Id.

2 Id. at81.
" EPSTEIN, supra note 1.
EPSMIN,BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 85.
0 Id.
31 Id.

32 "[itbecomes impoam totryto distinguish betweenlegislaticn that advances thecommon good.. from that which
advances only a factional intemtsL... The just compensation mquirement responds to that challenge." Id. at 85.
" Id.
3 Id. at 81.
IsId. at 93 (emphasis added).
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of imposing a condition on its receipt; at least those willing to meet the condition will
be better off.
2. The Allocation of Social Surplus
The question, though, is whetherthose who are not willing to meet the condition are
better or worse off 6 - for the answer to which it is useful to ask yet another, larger
question: what method of allocation would all self-interested parties (everyone) prefer
at the State B baseline, before they knew whether a particular method would make them
better or worse offin what would be apost-legal change State A?' Amarket-based, noncollective (non-governmental), purely and totally competitive approach, Epstein believes, should always be pursued if possible, "given the increase in total output that it
achieves .... There are," though, "many contexts in which noncompetitive means may
be resorted to in order to increase the total output of the system" - one of which is "the
imposition of well-defined property lights over a common pool situation, such as a
fishery or an oil and gas field."'3 In such an "absence of any clean market solution," he
believes, we "choose that allocation of the surplus that maximizes the likelihood
that... beneficial social change will be brought about.'39 "'herefore, if there is some
reason to believe that these social gains can be achieved by adopting some alternative
nile - here (say) one that calls for the pro rata allocation of the gains, across all participants - then so much the better."' Epstein posits six scenarios, the two most relevant
of which are reproduced in slightly revised and expanded form as Tables 1 and 2,
showing when there is reason tobelieve the maximizationof social gains canbe achieved
by adopting a pro-ratanle of allocation.

"See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
"

YEri,

BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 94.

Ild. at 94. This "cannot arise frm a simple government decree that secures open access to all comets within a
competitive market. Instead there has tobe a conscious effort toundo the existing set ofrights and to substitute another
in its place." Id.
"Id.at 94-95. "[The object ofthe legal system is not merelyto make sure that people are not hurt by the proposal ,
relative to the baseline of their orentitlements. his also an effort to maximize the total gain in question." d. at
96. "Second, minimize the administrative costs associated with the operation of the system." Id. at 95.
See supra § ILA.l. (notes 22-35 and accompanying text).
40 Id. at 96. "Calling the division of surplus pro rata ... is a bit optimistic, for it is unlikely that this condition will
beprecisely satisfied.... But treating the gains as though they were perfectly pro rata makes sense because it ensures
that they will not be dissipated by factional strife." Id. at 97.
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TABLE 1 Oppressive-Conditions Scenario 4t
(Allocation)

Group B

Overallsocialwelfare

x+5

x+5

2x+ 10

x+7

x- 1

2x +6

x + 5.5

X

2x + 5.5

Group A

(a) Before legal change

(State B baseline)
(b) After legal change
(State A)
(c) Legal change with
condition flunking
Pareto test (or)

(d) Legal change with

SOCIAL SURPLUS
(Maximization)

x

condition and costly

but just compensation
In his oppressive-conditions scenario, the transaction or legal change withoutsome
hypothetically coercive condition passes the Pareto test (b); everyone is better off. With

such an offending condition, however, the test recommends against the change because
those in Group B are worse off (c), or at least forjust compensation to Group B (d).4 No

reason exists to believe an alternative pro-rata nle of allocation is necessary to maximize overall social welfare.

41 See id. at 99 (Tis table represents Epstein's "Scenario 3: Oppressive Conditions") Id.; Epstein, Bargaining

Breakdown,supra note 4, at 199 C'Scenaio M: Oppressive conditions"). Epstein's preceding Scenarios I and 2 are
included as Tables a and b. Epstein, Bargaining, supra note 4, at 99; Epstein, BargainingBreakdown, supranote 4,
at 199. "[Scenario 1) is appropriate because it advances the welfare of the members of both groups."
EPSEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 98; Epstein, BargainingBreakdown, supranote 4, at 199-200.
TABLE a
Epstein's "Scenario 1: No conditions"
Group A
Group B
Before regulation
100
100
After regulation
150
150
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supranote 4, at 99.
TABLE b
Epstein's "Scenario 2: Virtuous conditions"
Group A
Group B
Before regulation
100
100
After regulation
150
150
With regulation and
160
160
good condition
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 99; Epstein, BargainingBreakdown,supranote 4, at 199. "Scenario 2 [is]
good because [it] improve[s] the situation either from the prior state of affairs, or from the regulatory intervention
without the attached condition." EpsrTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 98; see Epstein,BargainingBreakdown,
supra note 4, at 200.
SEPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 100.
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The case here does not concern the distribution of cooperative surplus, but
rather the simpler question of whether members of group B can claim that
they have not received just compensation ....
The case is therefore
amenable to invalidation under an ordinary takings analysis, without ever
reaching any concern about the size or distribution of the cooperative sur43
plus.
In the unconstitutional-conditions scenario, however, reason does exist to believe
the pro-ratarule of allocation is necessary to maximize social welfare.
TABLE 2 Unconstitutional-Conditions Scenario"
SOCIAL SURPLUS
(Maximization)
(Allocation)
Group A
Group B
Overallsocialwelfare
(a) Before legal change
(b) After legal change
(State B baseline)
(c) Legal change with
condition (State A)

x
x+5

x
x+5

2x
2x+ 10

x+6

x+3

2x + 9

Scenario 4, the unconstitutional conditions scenario, is designed to
prevent the unfortunate move from (b) to (d) of Scenario 3. In essence the
doctrine treats the outcome in (b) as the appropriate [State B] baseline
against which the success or failure of the subsequent condition is measured. It is as though the process took place in two stages. Fi the basic
regulation was imposed, and only thereafter was the condition in (c) attached [State A]. Ifthe condition flunks the Pareto test relative to the [State
B] baseline in (b), then the condition is struck down, even if the members
of Group B are better off in ... (c) [State A] [x + 3 > x]than they were in
(a)....
This case is one where mutual gains from a prior historical baseline do
not establish the social optimum, and therefore should not be respected. It
thus becomes clear why the greater/lesser argument is improper. Itpresupposes that the relevant comparison ... is between (a) and (c) [StateAl when

Epstein, Bargaining Breakdown, supra note 4, at 200.
See EPSTEIN, BARGAINNG, supra note 4,at 99 (Scenario 4: Unconstitutional Conditions"); see also Epstein,
Bargaining Breakdown, supra note 4, at 199 ("Scaario IV: Unconstitutional conditions').
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in fact the right comparison is between (b) [the State B baseline] and (c)
[State A].4
In other words, the conditionis now considered the legal change to which the Pareto
test is applied. The condition moves the scenario from the State B baseline to State A
- which is, again, Pareto optimal only if no party is worse off than before, or without,
the condition. This is done because "[tihe question is whether the condition advances
overall social welfare, and there is no guarantee that this will happen just because it is
consented to by the individual actor.... By blocking certain bargains between the
individual and the state, it becomes possible to improve overall social welfare [(2x + 10)
>

(2x +

9)].

'

146

So much the better.
Id. at 100; see Epstein,BargainingBreakdown,spra note 4, at 200. See supra notes 17 and 36, and accmpanying
text.
Id. at 101; see also Epstein, BargainingBreakdown, supra note 4. at 200.
Ther is no question that the final state of affairs [(c)] is Pareto superior to the initial state of affairs
[(a)]....
Nonetheless, there is both less of an aggregate increase than there was in the regulation
without the condition, as in (a), and a skewing c the benefits to Group A. The two phenomena are
closely related. The doctrine of uncomstitutonal conditions therefore restricts the alternatives
available to the aate.., to a choice between the initial unregulated situation and the unconditioned
legislation... The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions thus operates to good social purpose
when there is a Pareto improvement over the initial state of affais. This is the paradigmatic case
where the greater/lesser power arguments lose their normative force.
Epstein, BargaiaingBreakdown, supra note 4, at 200.
Epstein's succeeding Scenarios 5and 6 are included as Tables c and d.
TABLE c
Epstein's "Scenario 5: Problematic conditions"
GroupA
Group B
Before regulation
100
100
With regulation
150
150
With regulation and
160
170
efficient condition
FSTEN, BAROAIIN, supra note 4, at 99.
Scenario 5... produces gains that are not pro rata
on the one hand, but which maximize the overall
size of the pie on the other... Perhaps the presumption that Scenario 5is an empty set should not
be made absolute, but it surely should be overridden only with vey powerful evidence under some
compelling state interest."
Id. at 101. See infra § IILA.2. (notes 100-112 and accompanying text). See also infra note 139 and accompanying
texL
TABLE d
Epstein's "Scenario 6: Perverse conditions"
Group A
Group B
Before regulation
100
100
With regulation
150
150
With regulation and
130
130
perverse condition
OE N, BARGAINING, hapra note 4, at 99. Scenario 6 " satisfies the pro rata test, but. .. leaves everyone equally
worse off." Id. at 101.
4
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The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine - it is important to note, as Epstein does
is

a"second-best" approach to controlling government discretion.... In some
cases, the doctrine... is used to 'take back' some of the power which had
been conferred upon government officials in the first place. In principle,
the doctrine's application would be unnecessary if the Court had restricted
the scope of government power in the first place.,"
It is, in other words (ofEpstein's), "a mop-up doctrine" available for use "when other
forms of constitutional restraint have been abandoned.' Less bold, less stark; something of a fall-back position.
So, then, to the barricades?
B. Wisconsin's Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program
Take the well-known Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, passed by Wisconsin's
legislature in March 1990 at the behest of Democratic State Rep. Annette "Polly" Williams and, as part of a budget bill, signed by Republican Gov. Tommy Thompson the
following month. The program - against which, principally because of the properly
perceived danger of its inviting the ultimately stifling government overregulation of
existing successful private schools, there have been strong libertarian-conservative
dissenting arguments 4 9 - allows parents of "a family that has a total family income that
does not exceed an amount equal to 1.75 times the poverty level to send their children
to "any nonsectarianprivate school located in the city" using state tax money
equal to what the state would have given the Milwaukee Public Schools district

"Id. at 23; see also Epstein, Foreword, spra note 4, at 28.
EPSTEIN, BARGAIONG, supra note 4, at 23.
See,eg., CaadoneAllen, Choice: ABUrkwaDiDsent, AM.SPECrAORNov. 1993, at62. See alsoSeymourFliegel,
Public School Choice Works - Look at East Harlem, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1992, at A15 (Countepoint") ("The
voucher argument is a funding issue. It clouds the choice issue.").
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(M.P.S.)O per pupil, provided certain criteria are met by the student, his or her family,
and the participating private school 5
Table 3 shows the increasing degree of participation - by students and nonsectarian, private schools-

in the M.C.P. during the four academic years since its inception.

"See Susan Mitchl WhyMPSDoesn't Work. BarrierstoReformintheMilwuukeePublicSchools,7:1WIs. POL'Y
RES. INST. REP. (1994) (although M.P.S. is constantly sening new goals and promising reforms, its own bureaucracy
isthepimaryenemy of useful change andimproved education); seealsoSusan Mitch Tinkering wit hschoolswon't
work,shi controltoparents,BUS. J.,Jan. 22,1994, at 5; Dan Parks,MPSwoes blamed on bureaucracy,MILWAUKEE
SENTlDEL, Jan. 6, 1993, at IA; MPSnotfollowingup on its goals,studysays, MILWAUKEE SENflNL, Jam 6, 1993,
at 10A; MPS reportcard: System must upgrade, regadlessof Choice, MILWAUKEESS NE], Jan. 7,1994, p. 12A
" F- toals'); Findingfiasft w 'tcureMPS, MILAUEE J Jan. 11, 1994, atA 1O(JournalViewsj). See alro tris
Lawrence., MPS reform effortsfail to pay off in grades, test scores, MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 20, 1994, at Al.
- Wis. Sta. § 119.23(2Xa).(1990) (emphasis added). See generally George A. Mitchell, The Milwaukee Parental
ChoiceProgram,5:5 WiS. POL'Y RES. INST. REP. (1992); James B. Egle, Conmn, The Constitutiorallmplications
of School Choice, 1992 WIS. L REV. 459, Timothy T. Blank, Note, The Milwaukee ParentalChoice Program,Its
Policies,andits Legal Implications, I REJENr U.L REV. 107 (1991).
See also Scott Jensen, Tommy's Lessons: What Conservatives Can Learn From The Success Of Wisconsin's
Governor,2:2 Wis. INEREST, 47,49 (1993); Mikel Hot, We (Still) Have A Dream: What Do Black Parents Want
FromTheMilwaukeePublicSchools?,2:1 WIS. INTEREgr, 11,17 (1993); Tommy G. Tlompson, TheNew Wisconsin
Idea: Let'sTryTrustingPeopleToRun TheirOwnLives,2:1 WIs. INTEREST, 19.21 (1993); Quentin L Quade,Smoke
Screens:Howto cleartheaironSchool Choice, 1:2WIS. INTEREsT. 21 (1992). ContraAlien, supranote 49; Morris
Andrews, Blaming the Schools: Ourpublic schools can'tbe the public'sscapegoat, 1:2 WIS. INrEREAr, 29 (1992).
Recent legislative efforts to expand M.P.C.P.'s universe of choice to include parochial schools - supported by
Democratic Milwaukee Mayor John 0. Norquist, a former state legislator himself - have not met with sucoess. See
Amy Rinard, Light railadvances;Choice expansiondenied,MILWAUKEE SEmm, Mar. 11,1994, at 5A. See also
DanParksReligiousschools eyedfor Choice: Movemayadd4OOOstudents,MLWAUKEESENTEL, Feb. 17,1994,
at IA; Mike Nichols, Coalitionfights choice expansion: Religious and education groups oppose inclusion of
sectarianschools,MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 17,1994, at B 1; Choicefor churchschools unjust. MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 18,
1994, at A10 ("Journal Views"); Curtis Lawrence Bill to seek parochialchoice: Welch says structurefor quality
education is already in place, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 9, 1994, at B5.
A bill that wouldhave expanded theuniverse of sohochicetoincludeanypublicsch intheat with available
capacity was approved by the Finance Committee, 9-4, and sent to the Seate. Daniel Bice, BroaderChoice plan
advances, Key tuition compromise worked out by JointFinanceComemitte, MILWAUKEE SENTINIL, Feb. 24,1994,
at IA; Tn Keley, Committee spports school choice plan: Proponents like idea of competition,Wis. ST. ., Feb.
14,1994, at 3B; Richard P. Jones, Publicschool choice bill advances: Amendment aims to ease burden on poorer
disticts,MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 24,1994, at B 1. See Richard P. Jones, Bill wouldlet studentspickschool district: But
it would also make poor districtspay to send kids to wealthy districts, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 9,1994, at A&
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TABLE 3 Participation by Students and Private Schools in the M.P.

Eligible students 5 3
Applications
Available seats54
Participating students5
Participating schools56
Private, nonsectarian
schools in Milwaukee

2

1990-'91

1991-'92

1992-'93

1993-'94

931
577
406
341
7
22

946
689
546
521
6
22

950
998
691
620
11
23

968
1,049
811
742
12
23

(Thisdata and the high (and increasing) degree ofparticipationin aone-year-old, private,
non-state, school-choice program in Milwaukee - "Partners Advancing Values in Edu- From John F. Wine, Andrea B. Bailey & ChristopherA. Thorn, Third-Year Report, Milwaukee ParentalChoice
Program,Department of Political Science and The Robert La Follete Institute of Public Affairs, University of
Wiscosin-Madisun 33 (1993) (table 1) [hereinafter Wite]. See Daniel Bice, Study gives Choice programmixed
reviews: Math scores up this year,but readingachieement dropped,MILWAUKEE SENTMNm, Dec. 23,1993. at7A;
Dave Daley, Choice having little effect on test
scores, study shows: But parents are pleased and involved with
program, MILWAUKEE J., Dec. 23,1993, at Al; Verdict still out on choice schools, MILWAUKEE J., Dec. 23,1993,
at A6 ("Journal Views"). The M.P.C.R statute requires the state Department of Public Instruction (D.PI) to submi
an annual report on the program to the state legislature and participating schools. Wis. Stat. § l19.23(5XdX1990).
The D.P. chose Professor Wite to conduct the research for and write these reports. Regarding Wine's first such
report, see contra Mitchell, supra note 51, at 17-41.
- TheM.P.C.P. statute restricts thenumber of students eligible for theprogram to"[n]o mor than l%ofthe [M.P.S.]
school district's membership... in any school year." Wis. Star § 119.23(2)(b)1(1990). This will increase to 1.5%
in 1994-95. Wite,ssipranote52,ativ. (the infonnationappears at iv.inthe"Executive Summary"as wellas onpage
1 and page [331 in Figure 1.). The legislation that would have expanded the M.P.C.P. to include parochial schools
would also have increased this number to five percent in 1994-95. See supra note 51.
54"Officials at participating [M.PC.P.] schools say that because state reimbursement does not cover their operating
costs they camot afford to expand so more students can attend." Mitchell, supranote 51, at 14. This funding limit
and a stattory limit that studets in the M.P.C.P. cannot exceed 49% of a school's total enrollment, Wis. StaL §
119.23(2Xb)2, comabinetokeephundreds of students outoftheprogram. Mitchellsipra note 51, at 14. From results
of survey reported in id.(Table 5). See id. atn.36. The 49% limit will increase to 65%in 1994-95. Wine, supranote
52, at iii. (the information appears at iii in the "Executive Summary" as well as page I and page 1331 in Figure 1.).
" This data is as of the September cf each academic year. There have also been January and June "counts" for each
year, five out of the existing sixof which (data from the January and June counts for the cunent academic year are
not yet available) resulted in lower numbers than in September. Id. at [331 (Table I).
m,The M.P.C.R maybe an indirect cause of the Milwaukee Archidocese's abolishing of its three-school Cental City
Catholic School System (C.C.CS.S.) at the end of 1993-94. Emst-Ulhich Franzen, Catholic school s'ystem to be
closed: Archdiocese cite high costs, low enrollmentfor shutdown, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Jan. 27,1994, at IA,
6A.The M.C.P.has "been hurful to us," according to C.C.C.SS. administratorMichaelinaYoung. Id. The students
"getto go somewhere elseforfree,but they stillhave topay ifthey stay with us" Id. Total enrollmentin theC.C.C.S.S.
schools dropped from778 in 1989 to360in thefall of 1993. Made Rohde, Closing of3 schooLs stirsstrong reaction:
Outragedadministratorsaysshe's unlikely to workforchurchagain,MILWAUKEEJ., Jan. 28,1994, at B3. See Marie
Rohde, Archdiocese closing 3 centralcity schools: 2 will reopen to house new programserving whole families,
MILWAUKEE 3.,
Jan. 27,1994, at Bl. See alsoSaddemiseofinncilyschools,MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 29,1994, atA8
("Journal Views"). "Though we rue these closings, we remain opposed to public funding for sectrian schools,
directly orindirectly; entangling state and religionis unhealthy forbothparties. Id. We wish private funding had been
able to rescie these schools." Id. Regarding the latter, see infra note 57.
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cation" (P.A.V.E.)-demonstrate the desire ofinner-city, poorparents for school choice."
A majority of Wisconsin residents agree with them, according to polls by the Gordon S.
Black Corporation for the Wisconsin Policy Research Institute in Milwaukee.51).
Table 4 shows the amount of state aid that would have gone to the MP.S. system,

but instead has gone to or is going to these private schools, during the MP.C.P.'s four years.

7Maueen Wahl,Ph.D.,First-YearReportof the PAVE ScholarshipProgram,Family Service America,Inc. (1993).
The [P.A.V.E. program awards grant covering half the yearly tuition of private, sectarian, or independent schools to eligible families. Toqualify forthe program, families must fill out an application
and be eligible for the federal school-lunch program. In the 1992-93 academic year 4,094 students
applied for PAVE assistance. A total of 2,089 grants, 1,087 for elementary students and 282 for
secondary students, worth $1,278,93227 were awarded on a first-cone, first-serve basis. Of the
2,089 students who received PAVE scholarships, 1,151 were new to private shoools and 938 had
previously attended private schools. Currently, 79 private elementary and 7 high schools participate
in the PAVE program.
Id. at 6.
(Sixty-four percent of the C.C.C.S.S. students received assistance from the RA.V.E. program. Rohde,Closing of
3 schools stirs strong reaction,supra note 57. See supra note 57.).
-"See e g.,
The Wisconsin CitizenSurvey, December 1992: A Survey ofWisconsin PublicOpinion,5:6 WIS. POL'Y.
RES. INST. REP. 9,30-39. Table e shows this support.
TABLE e Support for Voucher-Based, School-Choice Programs Among Wisconsin Residents
Jan. 89
Jan. 92
Nov. 92
Sept. 88
Percentage of
residents who:
Favor
45%
46%
59%
54%
Oppose
47%
43%
32%
40%
Are tmdecided
8%
11%
9%
6%
Id. at 9.
Supportforvouchers ishighest among Blacks (78%), Catholics (59%), residents of Milwaukee
(67%), 18-24 years [sic] olds (63%), and parents with children in private parochial school (81%).
But even among parents with children in public schools, 62% support a voucher system.
...Sixty-oe percent endorsed making available to all parents in Wisconsin a choice plan
similar to that offered in Milwarkee... (meaning one by which] parents can send their children to
a local public or private school but not to a parochial schooL [See supranote 51 (S.B. 415).].
More than two-thirds (68%) endorsed making such a plan available to all parents in Wisconsin
if it included local parochial as well as local public and private schools....
Support for voucher-based choice systems is bolstered by the belief among most Wisconsin
residents (66%) that the competition resulting from a choice program will improve the quality of
education available to all children.
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TABLE 4 State Aid Transferred from M.P.S. to Private Schools in the M.P.C.P.

Amount per student
Total transferred

1990-'9159

19 9 1 _'9 2 10

$2,446

$2,643

$733,800

1992-'9361 1993-'946

$2,745

$2,987

$1,353,216 $1,630,334 $2,216,354

Students benefiting from the M.P.C.R have been and are, as intended, predominantly from low-income families; they are also mostly non-white. Table 5 shows the
family incomes of students intheM.P.C.P, inthe M.S. system overall, and in the M.P.S.

from low-income families.
TABLE 5

63
Family Income of MP.C.P.and M.RS. Students

M.RC.P."
Overall
$0-$4,999
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-19,999
$20,000-$34,999
$35,000-$49,999
$50,000+
Mean income
WIS.

17%
42%
28%
14%
0%
0%
$11,625

M.RS.
Low-incomel

13%
23%
21%
24%
13%
8%
$22,000

19%
34%
29%
14%
3%
0%
$12,130

DEPARTMENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM PAYMENr SUMMARY

1990-91, cited in Mitchell, sapranote 51. at 11 n.27 (1990) (Table 4).

Wis. DEPARmENT OF PUB. INshUCTIoN, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL ObOICE PROGRAM PAYMENT SUMMARY,
1991-92, cited in Michell.s&ra note 51, at I1n.27 (Table 4).
61WIS.DEPARMENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM PAYMENr SUMMARY,
1992-93.
0 "Aiotmt per studen" is from Wite, supra note 52, at iii. (the information appears at iiLin the "Executive
Summary" as well as at page Iand page 33 at Table 1.). "Total tunsferred" is from author's calculation, multiplying
amount per student by the number of participating students, as of September 1993. as reported by Wite. See sura
note 55 and accompanying entries in Table 3.
The "total transferre" for the first three academic years does not necessarily equal the "amount per student"
multiplied by the number of "participating students" as reported in Table 3 because the latter figure is, recall, as of
September only, the number of partiapaing students fluctuates throughout any particular academic year See
Mitchell, supra note 51, at 11 n.27 (Table 4).
From survey reported in Witte, supra note 52, at 36 (Table 5a).
1990 to 1992 combined. Id. See William N. Evans & Robert K4 Schwab, Who BenefasfromPrivateEducation?
Evidencefrom Quantile Regressioa,Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Md., September 1993, at 2 ("the benefits of Catholic school am greatest for students with the poorest observed characteristics
(low income, low parents education, etc.)") (parentheses in oiginul);,eealro W'dliamN. Evans &RobertM. Schwab,
FinishingHigh School and Starting College: Do CatholicSchools Make a Difference?, Department of Economics,
University of Maryland, College Park, Md., November 1993.
""[D]eflined as qualifying for free or reduced lunch. The income level for reduced lunch is 1.85 times the poverty
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Table 6 shows the race of students in the MJ.C.P. and the M.P.S. system.
TABLE 6

Race of M.P.C.P. and M.P.S. Students"6

M.P.C.pY

M.S."

African American
Hispanic
Native American
Asian American

77.6%
16.9%
0.9%
0.2%

55.3%
9.7%
0.9%
3.8%

White
Other

3.4%
1.2%

29.3%
1.0%

Wisconsin, through the M.P.C.P., bargains with the low-income Milwaukee parents

of the mostly non-white students like these: on the conditionthat you effectively waive
yourfree-exerciserights by agreeingto not spendit at religious schools,we' Ugive you
the now almost $3,000 we woulf ve given M.PS. to educate your chila and let you
spend it an any other school ofyour liking.
I. BANQUO'S ROAMING GHOST: MOVING TO MILWAUKEE?
The Landmark Legal Foundation -

least at the bar)70

-

as stated, already at the barricades (or at

has initiated a federal suit against this type of bargaining on

behalf of five families denied the choice to spend M..C.P aid at sectarianschools. In
the pending Miller v. Benson, Landmark argues this denial violates the parents' free-

exercise and equal-protection rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution's first and
fourteenth amendments, respectively;71 that it is, essentially, an unconstitutional

line, free lunch is 1.35 times the poverty line. Most low-income students qualify for free lunch." Wine, supra note
52,a 3.
" Id. at 36 (Table 5b).

67 Id. (data from 1990 to 1992 combined).
Id. (this 1991 data from Studnt Record Data Base, M.P.S. cited in id. at n.3).
* From, moreover, a "fund" (the state's general revenues) into which the parents, through income taxation, paid in
the first place. See ifrta notes 69, 130, and accompanying tex.
S"Indeed." "we have seen the jurisprudence" of concentrating "not on ensuring freedom but on enhancing the
democratic process" "lidify... by the unwillingness of opponents to challenge [it] on constitutional grounds."
Pilon, supranote 3, at 48.
' Complaint, Miller v. Benson, No. 93-C-1063 (E.D. Wis. SepL 30,1993), at 7. The original complaint has since
been amendedtoadd a fifth plaintiff and take into account theReligious Freedom Restoration Act (R.F.ILA.) of 1993,
Pub. Law No. 102-141,107 StaL 1488 (1993). Telephone conversation with Mark L Bredemeier, General Counsel,
Landmark Legal Foundation, Kansas City, Mo. (Jan. 6,1994). Regarding R.F.LA.,see ihfta § IILA.2.b. (notes 10712 and accompanying text).
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condition' 1 The unconstitutional-conditions doctrine's pro-ratanle of allocation thus
will, nearer the conclusion hereof, be applied to the facts of Miller.3
A. The GhostRoams: TheFree-ExerciseClause, Unemployment-CompensationCases
The Court has held in four cases that a state unconstitutionally conditioned aid to an
individual on an effective waiverof free-exercise rights74 intheunemployment-compensationO context - to the facts of each of which will also later be applied the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine'spro-rata rule of allocationr7 6 In 1963's Sherbertv. Verner
decision," 1987 'sHobbiev. UnemploymentAppeals CommissionofFloridadecision,
and 1989's Frazee v. Illinois Deparment of Employment Security - applying the
once-and-futuwY0 strict-scrutiny, compelling-interest standard for state infringements
on the free exercise of religion - the Court held that a state could not constitutionally
deny unemployment-compensation benefits to someone who became unemployed for
refusing to work on the Sabbath because of religious belief. In 1981 's Thomas v. Review

Should the portion of the M.P.C.P. statute excluding religious schools be declared unconstitutional, the rest of the
statute may survive under what is known as the doctrine of"sevefabllity." In the federal courts (and almost all state
courts), "[ulnless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left if fully operative as a law." Alaska
Airlines v. Brock, 480 US. 678,684 (1987). In Califano v. Westoon, 443 US. 76 (1979), for example, the Court held
tha a statue providing benefits to families whose dependent children are denied parental support because of unemployment ofthefather,but not of the mother, was unconstitutionally discriminatory. The Court suggested continued
extension of the benefits - without the discrimination - was the preferred course over nullification. Id. at 90-91.
73 See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying Table 8 and text.
7

' "Half of the tan public assistance cases in which the Court found a condition unconstitutional concerned the
claimants' rights under the free exercise clause of the first amendment." Baker, supra note 20, at 1243.

Regarding equal -protection rights, which are not directly addressed here, in a similar context (and with the same
judge as in Miller), see Milwaukee Montessori School v. Percy, 473 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Wis. 1979), in which a
Wisconsin statute exempting public and parochial schools from certain day-care licensing requirements was held an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection; there was no rational basis for the distinction between private parochial
schoos and otherprivate schools. Id. at 1360. TheMilwaukeeMontessori School also madefirst amendment claims,
but since the statute did not survive even rational-basi scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment, the court need not

have addressed than. Id. at 1359.
7

Unemployment compenution is perhaps - perhaps someday sometime soon with school-choice aid - a para-

digmatic example of an entitlement constituting what CharlesA. Reich coined in 1964 "the new property." Charles

A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733,733 (1964) ('Increasingly. Americans live on government largess
- allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipients subject to conditions which express 'the public
interest.'") Contra Epstein, Property, supra note 13.
76 See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying Table 7 and text.
I Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
7

Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)

79

Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 US. 829 (1989).

w See infra § DLA.. (notes 100-112 and accompanying text).
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Board of the IndianaEmployment Security Division, l under the same strict-scrutiny
standard, Indiana could not deny aid to someone who became unemployed for refusing

to participate in the production of armaments because of religious belief.
1. Four Steps Forward
InSherbert,plaintiffAdell Sherbert, amemberofthe Seventh-dayAdventist Church,
was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. 2 Sherbert was then denied the unemployment-compensation benefits otherwise available to her because this religiously driven behavior
constituted a "fail[ure], without good cause, to accept suitable when offered" rendering
herineligible forthe benefits.83 Justice William Brennan implicitly relied on the doctrine
ofunconstitutional conditions, in reasoning also subsequently relied upon and language
quoted in both Thomas and Hobbie: "[Not only is it apparent that appellant's declared
ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice ofher religion, but the pressure
upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable." 4 According to Brennan,
The ruling [disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert from benefits because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her faith] forces her to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion..., on the
other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind
ofburden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against
appellant for her Saturday worship.P
,t Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
u Sherbert,374 US. at 399.
aId. at401.
' Id. at 404, quoted in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,140 (1987), Thomas, 450 U.S.
at 716-17; EpsTEIN, BARGAINING, supranote 4, at 259; see Epstein, Foreword, supra note 4, at 81-82.

" Sherbert,374 U.S. at404, quotedinHobbie,480 U.S. at 140;,Thomas, 450 U.S. at716-17; EPsTEIN, BARGAINING,
supranote 4, at 259; Epstein, Foreword, supranote 4, at 81-82. (The brackets are used only in Thomas). See also
Baker, supra note 20, at 1203:
This... then, gives rise to a further, critical question: On what basis does the Court distinguish
a condition that burdens orimpinges on a constitutional right frm one that does not?... A condition
that "coerces" claimants or is likely to deter them from exercising a constitutional right simultaneously (and impennissibly) burdens those claimants. In contrast, a condition that is empirically
unlikely to affect a claimant's exercise of a right constitutes no such burden. This .... of course, is
not an answer to, but rather a restatement of, the original question....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem ofBwdens on the FreeExercise of Religion, 102 HARV.
L REV. 933 (1989) (cowls should consider a government policy burdensome to the free exercise of religion if an
analogous act committed by an individual would violate generally accepted common-law norms). "[Sherbert,
Thomas, and Hobbie] can be squared with the common law approach to defining free exercise burdens by supplementing the traditional common law conception of property with the concept of 'entitlement'." Id. at 977 (footnote
omitted). (See supranote 75 (Reich's "new property")).
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This burdenr'fine" could not be justified by an interest sufficiently compelling enough
to survive the Court's strict scrutiny.86
In Thomas, plaintiff Eddie Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness whose religious beliefs
prevented him from participating in the production ofweapons, was initially hired by the

Blaw-Knox Foundry &Machinery Co. to work in a foundry producing steel fora variety
ofindustrial uses.8 ' After Blaw-Know closed that foundry, the only departments remaining in the company were all engaged directly in the production of weapons; Thomas was
transferred to a deparunent that fabricated turrets for military tanks.' He quit, and was
thendenied unemployment-compensationbenefitsbecausehe didnothave"good cause"
forwhat was considered this "voluntary tennination. ' 9 After quoting the above Brennan
language in Sherbert,Chief Justice Burger wrote:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief,thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden

upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantiaL9
Under the strict-scrutiny standard, none "of the interests advanced [by Indiana for its
denial of aid] is sufficiently compelling to justify the burden upon Thomas' religious
liberty. Accordingly, Thomas is entitled to receive benefits unless... such payment
would violate the Establishment Clause."91
In Hobbie, plaintiff Paula Hobbie was hired by Lawton and Company, a Florida
jeweler, and then three yearslater was baptized into the Seventh-dayAdventist Church.9
Hobbie was thus then, for religious reasons, unable to work on her Sabbath." Lawton's
general manager informed her"that she could eitherwork her scheduled shifts [including
on the Sabbath] or submit her resignation to the company. 4 When Hobbie refused to do
"Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09. "Inholding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the'establishment' ofthe SeventhdayAdventist religion in South Carolinaforthe extension ofunemploymentbenefits to Sabbatarians in commonwith
Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the govenmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differenes .... " Id. at 409.
87 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710.
-Id.

ld. at 709-12.
0 Id. at 717-18, quoted in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
"1 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719.
n Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138.
nId.

"Id.
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either, Lawton discharged her."" Florida could not offer the Court a state interest
sufficiently compelling enough to survive the necessary strict scrutiny for free-exercise
cases.96

And in Frazee,very similarly, plaintiff William Frazee refused to work on Sunday
which he, though not a member of a formally organized religion, called "the Lord's
day" - and thus could not accept the offer of a temporary retail position by Kelly
Services. 97 Frazee's application for unemployment-compensation aid was denied because, according to the Illinois Department of Employment Security's Board ofReview,
"[w]hen a refusal of work is based on religious convictions, the refusal must be based
upon some tenets or dogma accepted by the individual of some church, sect, or denomination" and not "on an individual's personal belief."" While "there may exist state
interest sufficiently compelling to override a legitimate claim to the free exercise of
religion," Justice Byron White wrote for the Cour, "[n]o suchinterest has been presented
-

here."

2. Other, More-Recent Steps
a. One step back
In 1990's Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
' the Court refused to apply
Smith,"W in "a tremendous blow against religious liberty,"10
the up-to-then requisite strict-scrutiny standard to a denial of aid to Native American
Church members who became unemployed for ingesting peyote in religious ceremonies 102 In Smith, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, members of the Native American
Church, "were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization
because they ingested peyote [a criminally prohibited "controlled substance" under
Oregon statutes] ataceremony"oftheirchurch, as described byJustice Scalia."°3 "[They
were determined to be ineligible for [unemployment-compensation] benefits because

Id.
"Id. at 141-42. In so doing, the Court again rejected the argument "that the awarding of benefits to Hobbie would
violate the Establishment Clause." Id. at 144.
'Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 830.
"Id.
Id. at 835.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
CLINT BOuCK. GRASSROOTS TYRANNY: THE LIMITS OF FEDERALISM 105 (1993).
e Smilh, 494 U.S.'at 885.
'm

Id. at 874.
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they had been discharged for work-related 'misconduct ' ..I'l - a denial that did not,
according to Scalia, violate their free-exercise rightsY0 Smith's and Galen's claim for

relief, Scalia wrote,
res sonour decisions inSherbert. .. ,Thomas..., andHobbie. ..
,inwhich
we [using the strict-scrutiny, compelling-interest standard] held that a State
could not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an
individual's willingness to foigo conduct required by his religion....
[HIowever, the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law.

We held that distinction to be critical ....
06
b. One step back forward
However, the Religious Freedom RestorationAct (R.ER.A.) of 1993 1 -relatively
quietly signed, amid all the hubbub over the North American Free Trade Agreement
(N.A.F.T.A.), in mid-November by President Bill Clinton m - explicitly restores the
10o
Id. at 875.
As Id.at 890. In soholding, theCout
went beyond allowing the state toforbid this sacred religious practice. It silently overturned decades
of case prcedents and announced anew rulethat could severely limit religious liberty in many other
contexts. Henceforth, as long as the challenged government regulation is not aimed at religion and
affects only religious practices, not beliefs, a law of general applicability is valid regardless of its
impact on religious liberty.
BOuCK, supranote 101, at 105. See Kenneth Main, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the
State ofFreeExerciseDoctrine,40 AM. U.L REV. 1431 (1991) ("[Albandoning strict scrutiny of free exercise claims
eliminates a significant safeguard of religious liberty;" "removal of the state's burden to satisfy strict scrutiny will
have the highly undesirable effect of generating legislative indifference toward religions beliefs").
See also Michael W McComnell, Free Exerise Revysionw'n and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHL L REV. 1109 (1990).
Religious exercise is no longer to be treated as apreferred freedom; so long as it is treated no
worse than commercial or other secular activity, religion can ask no more. The needs of minority
religion are no longerto be legally entitled to equal consideration from the state. If practitioners of
minority religions cannot protect themselves, that is the "consequence of democratic government."
which they should recognize as "unavoidable."
Id. at 1153. Contra Wdliam P. Marshall,In Defense ofSmith andFreeExerciseRevisionism, 58 U. CIt L REV. 308
(199 1); bad see Michael W. McConnell, A Response to ProfesorMarshall,58 U. Cn. L REV. 329 (1991).
1*1Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. "In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all ....Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal
law." Id. at 883-84.
"The Smith Court began its discussion of these [unemployment-compensation] cases by noting that the compelling
interest test had not led to the invalidation of any government action'except the denial of unemployment compensation,' as if that were a coherent distinction." McConnell, supranote 97,at 1122-23 (footnote omitted). "Mysteriously, the Smith Court said there were only three" such unemployment-coipensaion cases, omitting Frazee
without explanation. Id. at 1122 n.56.
SPub. L No. 103-141.107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
t See Peter Steinfels, New Law ProtectsReligious Practices,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,1993, atA13.
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strict-scrutiny standard used inSherbert,Thomas,Hobbie,andFrazeeforcases in which
free-exercise rights are burdened:
SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF
PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS. - The Congress finds that-

(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing governmental interests.""
(b) PURPOSES.

-

The purposes of this Act are

(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion
is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise
is substantially burdened by government. 110
SEC. 3. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED

(b) EXCEPTION. - Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person (1) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

, Pub. L No. 103-141 § 2(aXS).
IId. § 2(aXS)(b).
"

Id. § 3(b).
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(c) JUDICIAL RELIEF. - A person whose religious exercise has been
burdened in violation ofthis section may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.

11 2

B. From..., To... : An (Economic)Analysis of Establishment-and Free-Exercise
Clause, Unconstitutional-ConditionsCases
"[A] ssume," "economist" Epstein, analyzing Sherbertand echoing his rationale for
the unconditional-conditions doctrine's pro-ratarule of allocation,11 3 writes,
that all the contributions to the unemployment system are collected from

a tax imposed directly or indirectly on the workers and the firm. Assume
further that random distributions of wealth between, say, plumbers and

pipefitters, are permitted under ordinary unemployment compensation
programs. Now divide the world into two classes of people, those who
mightquitjobs for religious reasons and those who wouldnot. The question
that the [first amendment's establishment ("no law respecting an establishment ofreligion.. .') and free-exercise C'... orprohibiting the free exercise

thereof')] religion clauses ask is whether there is an implicit redistribution
of wealth across those two classes -

eitherway. If the redistribution runs

from religious persons to nonreligious persons, then we have a free exercise
clause violation. If it runs in the opposite direction, then we have an
establishment-clause violation. Which is it?" 4
12

,ld. § 3(c The R.F.RA. also conains aprovisim foran offending government topay attomeys"fees to aprevailing

party. Id. § 4. Regarding "substantially burdens," see supra note 84.
Mordecai Lee, executive director of the Milwaukee Jewish Council for Community Relations - which has announced its intention to Join in an amicus curiae brief against Landmark's challenge to the M.P.C.P.'s exiusion of
setarian schools, State Jewish group joins Choice dispute, MILWAUKEE SENTDE, Nov. 15,1993, at 13A - has
favorably cited the R.FR.A. in speaking against an exclusive Milwaukee suburb's active unwillingness to allow a
synagogue to be built there. Belling and Company (WISN-TV, Ch. 12, Milwaukee, television broadcast, Jan. 30,
1994). See, eg., DavidThme,Vdlage board wi//Listentomoretestimony on temp/e, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 22,1994,
at B8; David Thorne, Decision on synagogue is at least a month off,MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 77,1994, at B 1; Lisa Sink,
Hearing on synagogue draws 300, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Jan. 27,1994, at 8A. Friends of synagogue place ads,
MILWAUKEE SENTi
, Jan. 26,1994, at 4A.
"

See supra § ILA.2. (notes 36-46 and accompanying text).

EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supranote 4, at 261 (emphasis in odginal; brackets, including parentheticals therein
citing US. CoNsr. amend. L supplied) seeEpstein,Forewordsupranot4,
at84; seealsoEpstein,ReliiousLiberty
in the Welfare State, 31 WV.& MARY L REV. 375,391 (1990) ('Forcing the noeeligious to subsidize the religious
... injects the possibility of one-way transfers across the deep divideo separate factions or groups - a recipe for
political dynamite.". Contra SUNsrEIN, supra note 17, at 297-98.
"'

[NMo constitutional provision generally forids "redisibution." Since the [period of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a 10-hour/day statute forcertain classes ofbakers), the
Constitution has been construed to authorize a wide range of changes benefiting some groups and
burdening othes,largely on the understanding that existing distributions of wealth and property are
not sacroanct. When a redistribution is found unconstitutional, it isjudged to be so not because of
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1. The Unemployment-Compensation Cases
In Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee, it was a fwee-exercise violation; the
redistribution, the Court found, ran from religious persons to nonreligious persons.
Sherbert, Hobbie, Thomas, and Frazee, respectively, were unconstitutionally forced to
subsidize nonreligious workers when their states conditioned any unemployment-compensation benefits to be paid to them - from a governmentally collected pool of resources, an unemployment-compensation fund, into which they and their firms paid on foregoing certain religiously driven behavior. The state could not bargain with them
that way, according to the CourL
To do so created, in each case, the unconstitutional-conditions scenario ofTable 7,
showing that a pro-ratarule of allocating the benefits maximized overall social gain.
TABLE 7
The Unemployment-Compensation Programs in Sherbert,Thomas,
Hobbie, and Frazee and their Unconstitutional Conditioning of Aid on an Effective
Waiver of a Recipient's Free Exercise of Religion"

UNEMPLOYMENT-COMPENSATION AID (SOCIAL SURPLUS)
(Allocation)
(Maximization)
"Non-religious" Sherbert,Hobbie,
Overall
recipients
Thomas, and Frazee socialwelfare
(a) Before programs
(b) After programs
(State B baseline)

x
x + aid for
which all are
eligible ("5')

(c) Programs with
x + aid for
unconstitutional
which "nonconditioning of aid
religious"
on foregoing certain recipients are
religiously driven
eligible ("6')
behavior (State A)

x
x + aid for
which all are
eligible ("5')
x + aid for
which religious
recipients are
eligible ("3')

2x
2x + "I"

2x + "9"

any general contittional dibility,but because particular
costith mal provisims rule off-limins
particular government acts, some of them admittedly redistributive.
...[Uness we are to return to Lochner, redistribuive and paternalistic programs are no longer
constitutionally out d bounds.
Id.(footnote omited). See supra note 19.
11
Table 7 and 8am, like Tables I and 2 herein, revised and expanded forms of Epstein's tables. See supra note 41
and accompanying Table I and note 44 and accompanying Table 2, and infra note 120 and accompanying Table 8.
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Treating the outcome in (b) as the appropriate State B baseline against which the
conditioning of aid on foregoing certain religiously driven behavior in State A (c) is
measured, the condition in (c) fails the Pareto test" along with the strict-scrutiny standard; Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee are worse off in State A than they were at
the State B baseline. The condition is struck down - even though Sherbert, Thomas,
Hobbie, and Frazee would have been better off in State A (c) than without the compensationprograms at all. "Thequestion," recall, "is whether the condition advances overall
social welfare, and there is no guarantee that this will happen just because it is consented
to by the individual actor... By blocking certain bargains between7 the individual and
the state, it becomes possible to improve overall social welfare.""11
2. Another Step Forward?
In the school-choice context, similarly, divide Wisconsin taxpayers into two classes
ofpeople, those who would send their children to sectarian schools and those who would
not. The question the religion clauses ask of the M.PC.P. is whether there is an implicit
redistribution of wealth across these two classes, either way. If the redistribution runs
from religious persons to nonreligious persons, then we have a free-exercise violation.
If it runs from nonreligious persons to religious persons, then we have an establishmentclause violation.
Which is it?
a.

Recent education-funding, establishment-clause cases

A lawsuit by a Puerto Rican teachers' association and supported by, among others,
the American Civil Liberties Union, against that commonwealth's school-choice plan,
which includes religious schools within its universe of choice, asserts the plan is thus an
establishment-clause violation.118 Based on past decisions in the general context of

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See smpra note 46 and accompanying text (quoting EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 100-01).
It See Rick Henderson, School Switch: Puerto Rico's Voucher Program, REASON, Feb. 1994, at 13; Clint Bolick,
Puerto Rico: Leadinq the Way inSchool Choice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,1994, at All (ClbeAmericas").A commonwealth superior court on April 19, 1994, held the plan unconstitutional under a provision in the commonwealth
oonstiutio "whichprovidesthatnopublicfundsorproperties shall be used forthe educationin, orforthe sustenance
["sostenimiento" or benefit of schools or educational institutions which are not those of the stat" Teachers Ass'n
of Puerto Rico v. Tores, No.KAC 93-1268, at 2 (Apr.19,1994) (translation from Spanish by the Institute for lustice,
a public interest legal organization in Washington D.C., helping to defend the plan). The decision will be apealed to
"'

"t

Puerto Rico's highest court.The superior cour noted that because this provision of the commonwealth constitution
is broader in its prohibition than the "establishment dause" of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States .... the vast juisprudence of the Supreme Cow of the United States
interpreting what is and is not allowed under the more limited scope and reach of the prohibition in
the fim Amndment is not of full aplication to the controversy at hand.

Id.at 19 (citations omitted)
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education funding, however, the Court-as inthe above free-exercise, unemploymentcompensation cases'1 9 - would likely not consider the use by religious persons as
individuals ofwealth from a"fund"into which nonreligious person contiibuted (through

taxation) an establishment-clause violation. "Where, as here [and, importantly, as with
the M.RC.P.], aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions of
individual parents, no 'imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed to have been conferred onany particularreligion, oron religion generally" then-Justice W'lliam Rehnquist
wrote in 1983's Mueller v. Allen,12° in which the Court held that Minnesota state tax
deductions forexpenses incurred in sending children to parochial schools did not violate
the establishment clause.121 Any redistribution from nonreligious persons to religious
persons wasn't at the state's behest, the Court found, but rather at that of one acting in
his or her individual capacity. 2

In 1986's Witters v. WashingtonDeparomentofServicesfor the Blind,similarly, the
Court rejected an establishment-clause challenge to state assistance for a blind person
studying ata Christian college "only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of the aid recipient,"'' in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, who knew
something about constitutional guarantees and schools. "[The fact that aid goes to
individuals means that the decision to support religious education is made by the indiShould any potential future legislation expanding the M.PC.P. toinclude religious schools,.seesapranote 51. pass
and be signed into law by Governor Thonpson (or a successor), there would likely be a similar such establishmentclause challenge by local and/or national organizations to the new and larger program - including on state constitutional grounds. "TheWisconsin Constitution is much tougher on the separation of church and state than the federal
constitution." Mordecai Lee, Member, Steering Conmizee, Wisconsin Coalition for Public Education, and Executive Director, Milwaukee Jewish Council (see sipranote 112), quoted in Nichols, Coalitionfightschoice expansion,
supra note 51. "Many states, have establishment clauses that are more restrictive than the federal establishment
clause," Garnet v. Renton School Dist No. 403,987 .2d 641,646 (9thCir.1993), citingNote, Beyond the ErtablishmentClause: Enforcing SeparationofChurchandStateThroughState ConstitutionalProvisions,71VA. L REV.
625,632-33 (1985) -including Wisconsin. Indeed, independent Messmer High School, rn by the Archdiocese of
Milwaukee until 1984, was held ineligible fortheM.P.C.P. by state hearing examiner Thomas R. Grogan on May 7.
1993, because it was "pervasively sectarian" and thus its inclusion would violate the state'sestablishment clause. Lee
Sherman Dreyfus (Interim State Superintendent, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction), In the Matter of the
Eligibility of Messmer High School for Participationin the Milwaukee ParentalChoice Programas established
under § H923, Wis. Stats., May 25, 1993; see Parochial-schoolban in voucher plan hailed, M. TRM., May 21,
1993, at7 (Americans United forthe Separation of Church and State, which had filed briefwith state hearing examner
opposing Messmer's inclusion, hails examiner's decision to exclude Messmer).
Now, the federal free-exercise clause, of course, would - if it ever came to this - be more powerful than the state
establishment clause (or, in the case of Puerto Rico, the commonwealth education-funding clause). In other words,
a successful federal free-exercise challenge to the original M.P.C.R's exclusion of sectarian schools would "trump"
a successful state establishment-clause challenge to an expanded M.P.C.P.'s inclusion of sectarian schools. Cf
Garnett, 987 F.2d at 646 (while "[sltate constitutions can be more protective of individual rights than the federal
Constiuon... states cannot abridge rights granted by federal law") (citations omitted; emphasis added).
10 See supra § I.A.l., especially notes 86 and 96. See also generally Jon S. Lerner, The ConstitutionalCasefor
UniversalSchool Choice in Minnesota, Center of the American Experiment, Minneapolis, Minn., October 1993.
463 U.S. 388,399 (1983) (citation omitted).
InId. at 402-3.
mId.at 399.
mWitters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for ame Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986).
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vidual, notthe State."'' Again, any redistribution from nonreligious persons to religious
persons wasn't at the state's behest, but at that of an individual (who, in this case, paid
along with everyone else into the pool of resources collected by the Washington state
government from which the aid was drawn).
And in last term's Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothillsSchool District,the Court held that
the public provision of a sign-language interpreter for a student in a Catholic school
under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (I.DE.A.) did not violate
the establishment clause "just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit," in the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist:"
in1Id. "F-or example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees, who may then donate all or part of that

paycheck to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier, and the Ste may do so even knowing that the
employeemsoimends todismose fhis salar." Id.at48647(footnohteied). Foranothr(permaps somewhatmore
pointed) exanple, according to a recent computer analysis of 1990 census data by the University o Wisconsin at
Madison's Applied Population Laboratory done at the request of The Milwaukee Journal,half the public-school
teachers who live in Milwaukee's central city sent their children to public schools, including religious ones. Richard
P.Jones, Teacherschoose privateschoos, MILWAUKEE ., Nov. 14,1993, at 1,4. "We've got a lot of members who
are very religious," said Chuck Howard, president of the Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association, "and they
decide to send their children to religious schools." Id. at 4. Added Richard Collins, president of the Visconsin
Education Association Council: "I've known public school teachers who just feel they want to send their kids for
religious instruction." Id.
Public funds provided to individuals, of course, ar already constitutionally spent at religions institutions in the
child -care and college -grant contexts. See, eg., Susan Mitche L FducatioaalChoicein Wisconsin: PublicFwdsfor
PrivateSchools,EarlyChildhood through Past-Secondar, 6:4 WIS. POL'Y. RES. INsT. REP. (1993). "Thousands
of participants" in Wisconsin programs providing public funds to individuals for private education already "use
publich funds to attend church-affiliated instutions." Id. at 2. The college-level
misconsin Tuition Grant Program,
for example, "has provided note than $200 million through about 194,000 grams for students at private, nonprofit
universities in Wisconsin. The majority are church-affiliated," id. at 29 - including, among others, (alphabetically)
Cardinal Stritd, Marian, Marquette, Mount Mary, St. Norberk and Wisconsin Lutheran, id. at 32.
m Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S. CL 2462,2469 (1993). The Court may extend the MuellerWaurs-Zobrestline of reasoning this term. In late November 1993, it agreed to consider an establishment-clause
challenge to a New York statue creating an entirely new school district geographically contiguous with a village of
Hasidiclews. UndaGreenouse,Jtice Wdil HearChurch-StateCaselnvolving Hasi&m • Appeal sfromN!ewlor,
N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 30,1993, atAl-; WALL ST. J.,Nov. 30,1993, at A3, AS (MQurch and State"); Tony Mauo, Jewish
schooitetrchurch-stateseparaion Courts newest member couldcast the crucia!vote, USATODAY, Nov. 30,1993,
atAg; see Jacques Stainberg,Coun'sMoveElates Vldlage ofJewish Sect,N.Y. TmaENov. 30,1993, at B8; see aLso
Joseph Berger, Public School DisputeFight Tearing a Hasidic Sect, N.Y. TIMS, Jan. 3,1994, at A7.
The distrkt was the result ofa political compinise with the Hasidim who were seeking public education for their
handicapped childrem Grniet v. Board of Education 592 N.Y.S. 2d 123,125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). The decision
from which they are appealing cited Mueller,but"[c~oasidering the entire context in which the statute was enacted,"
thought the "symbolic impact" of the arrangement too strong. Id.at 127 (citing the establishment clause's tripartite
analysis in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602 (1971)) see Grumet v. New York State Education Depaitment, 579
N.YS. 2d 1004 (Sup. 1992).
See also William Bentley Ball, A Chance to Untangle the Law, CRISIS, Feb. 1994, at 16 ("The Kiryas Joel case
highlights the mass of contradictions which the Court's church-state jurisprudence has become;" "One hopes (but
rather douts) that the Supreme Court... will at least face up to the fictions and absurdities oLemon v. Kurtzman,
which has been the great instrumentemployed by ourconrts fortwodecades in seclaizirg oursciety") (parentheses
inotiginal);Anoherchurch-stateriddle,CHL TRiB., Jan. 9,1994,§4,at2 ("New York went too fartoaccomnmodate
the Hasidim, partly because the Supreme Court eliminated more easonable options").
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By according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute

ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian
school only as a result of the private decision of individual parents. In other

words, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to
choose a sectarian school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state decisionmaking. 12
Any redistribution, once again, was at the behest of an individual (who, also again, paid
into the - here, federally collected - resource pool from which the aid was drawn).
b. A free-exercise, education-flmding case: Miller
Wouldthe Court consider the M.RC.P, as Landmark essentially urges, an unconstitutional redistribution of wealthlxl from religious persons to nonreligious persons and
thus a free-exercise violation? To deny its school-choice aid to the low-income parents
wishing to send their children to sectarian schools solely because those parents will not
satisfythecondition that such aid onlybe spent atnonsectarian schools- to bargainwith
them like that, as unconstitutionally done in Sherbert,Hobbie, Thomas, and Frazeelt
-the M.RC.P. is effectively forcing them to subsidize other parents notwishing to send

theirchildren to sectarian schools.'I (Now, Undmark's low-income parental plaintiffs'
*m Zobrest, 113 S. CL at 2467. In interpreting the LD.E.A. in this tenn's Florence County School District Four v.
Carter, 114 S. Ct 361, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor quoted a statement fron a lower-court opinion that is just as
easily applicable to the M.P..CP.: "[lithardly sees consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from educating
their child at a school that provides an appropriated education simply because that school lacks the stamp of approval
of the same public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the first place." Id. at *12. (quoting Carter
v. Florence County School Dist., 950 F2d 156,164 (4th Cir.1991)). See LindaGreenhouse, CowRRules ForParents
In TrainingOf Disabled,N.Y. TINMES,Nov. 10,1993, at B8; Richard Carelli (Associated Press), Court makes it easier
for school reimbursement,Wis. STATE J., Nov. 10, 1993, at 4A.
I Again, from a fund, or"pool of resources," into which both religious and nonreligious person contributed through
taxation. See supranotes 69 and accompanying text; infra note 130 and accompanying text.

I See supra notes 74-99, 113-17, and accompanying text.
Is None of Epstein's writings cited herein on the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine addresses its ramifications on
school choice or education vouchers as directly as Sunstein:
How would [Epstein's understanding of the doctrine] apply in the cases at hand? To take just one
example, it would require that a government that funds public schools must also fund private
schools. Some version of avoucher system foreducation is constitutionally compelled. The reason
is that if government funds public schools alone, it will be working an impermissible redistribution
from one group of taxpayen to another. Itis redistribution against which the Constitution guards.
SUNSrMN, THE PARTIAL CONsTrIuION, supranote 17, at 297.
See also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHL L REV. 115,132,133 (1992).
By taxing everyone, but subsidizing only those who use seaularschools, the government creates a
powerful disincentive for parents to exercise their constitutionally protected option to send their
children to parochial schools. Nondiscriminatory allocation of educational resources would restore
religious parents to the neutral set of incentives they faced before the government forced them to
support secular education.
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incomes are probably so low that they do not, in relative terms, contribute much to the
Wisconsin general revenues from which the aid funding the M.P.C.P. is drawn." The
state, however, is still unconstitutionally bargaining with these families - arguably,
because of their low-income status, with even more heavy-handed undue leverage over

them and their free-exercise fights). 3' The state cannot bargain with them that way.
To do so creates the unconstitutional-conditions scenario of Table 8, showing that
a pro-ratarule of allocating M.P.C.P. aid maximizes overall social gain.
... Religious parents do not seek to be absolved from paying their fair share toward the public
good of education; their objection is to being excluded from that good.
Id. Sunstein's and McConnell's scenario, mind you, is not exactly the same as the one in Miller - in which the state
has already established a choice program including private schools, but just not parochial schools. See also STEPHEN
L CAWE, THE CULTURE OF DISHELEF. HOW AMEmCAN LAwAND PoLmcs TkrVI
ZS RELIGIOUS DEVOTioN 200 (1993).
Should a voucher program ever be established - and I am by no means saying that it should be parents who choose to send their children to religious schools should be eligible alongside parents
who send their children elsewhere. In a technical sense, this does indeed constitute government
support for religion, for a voucher is nothing but a direct subsidy from government revenues. But
itis support without discrimination - all religious schools would be equally eligible, andnone would
have any advantage over nonreligious schools. For the government to subsidize some private
schools but refuse to subsidize the religious ones would make religious schools more costly and
would thus constitute a government-created disincentive touse them. Inotherareasofconstitutional
law, we do not call such disincentives "neutrality"; we call them "discrimination."
Id. (emphasis added; footnote omined).
Contra Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. CHL L REV. 195,221,222 (1992). C'1lt
is a mistake to see these developments as a penahy on religionists who would ratherhandle education and charity their
own way... Religionits gain from the provision of universal public education even if they withdraw their children
to private schools .... [Vouchers are not compelled."); Sunstein, Why the UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine
is an Anachrnism,supra note 13, at 610 CA system in which government may fund public schools but not private
schools, and allows its citizenry to opt out of the public school system at its own expense, seems to be the best
reconciliation of the competing interests").
am See supra note 63 and accompanying Table 5. According toWisconsin Department ofRevenue estimates (taking
known 1992 figures and accounting for inflation), the 1994 poverty level for a single-parent, one-child family is
approximately $10,250. Multiplying by 1.75, this family must have a total family income not exceeding $17,900 to
beeligiblefortheM.P.C.P. This family, through its income taxes, would pay about $543 to the state general revenues
from which the aid funding the program is drawn. The 1994 poverty level for a two-parent. two-child family is
approximately $15,100. Multiplying by 1.75, this family must have a total family income not exceeding $26,400 to
be eligible for the M.P.C.P This family, through its income taxes, would pay about $937 to the state general revenues
from which the aid funding the program is drawn. Telephone conversation with Dennis Collier, Director, Bureau of
State Tax Policy. Division of Research and Analysis, Department of Revenue, State of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
(Dec. 16, 1993).
1 See Baker, supra note 20.
[Baker] presents a positive theory of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in challenges involving public assistance benefits. The theory proposes that the Court,subsilentio,has been employing
a straightforward test in deciding nearly all conditional allocations cases involving these benefits:
The Court declines to defer to the legislature only when the challenged condition requires persons
unable to earn a subsistence income, and otherwise eligible forthe pertinent benefit, to pay a higher
price to exercise their constitutional rights than similarly situated persons earning a subsistence
income. The theory rests on two critical facts: The exercise of many constitutional rights carries
a price for the individual; and statutory conditions on benefits can adversely and discriminatorily
affect that price.
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TABLE 8
The M.P.C.P. in Miller and its Unconstitutional Conditioning of Aid
on an Effective Waiver of a Recipient's Free Exercise of Religion"
M.P.C.P. AID (SOCIAL SURPLUS)

(Allocation)
"Nonreligious"
recipients
(a) Before M.P.C.P.
(b) AfterM.P.CP.
(State B baseline)

x

(Maximization)
"Religious"
recipients
(Miller
plainfi""M)
x

x + aid for
x + aid for
which all are
which all are
eligible ("5C) eligible ("5")

(c) M.RC.P. with
x + aid for
unconstitutional
which "nonconditioning of aid
religious"
on waiver of right to
recipients are
send children to religious eligible ("6")
school with that aid

x + aid for
which religious
recipients (Mxller
plaintiffs) are
eligible ("3")

Social
welyare
of all
recipients
2x
2x + "1"

2x + '9"

(State A)
Treating the outcome in (b) as the appropriate State B baseline against which the
conditioning of M.P.CP aid on foregoing sending an eligible child to a religious school
with it inthe existing StateA(c) is measured, the conditionin (c) fails the Pareto test along

Id. at 1188. See also supra note 129 C[A system allowing] citizenry to apt out of public school system at its own
expense" is best). Sumatein, supranote 13, at 610.
See alsoMyron Liebennan, The School Choice Fiasco, 114 PUB. INTEREsr 17,34 (1994).
For a cem y or mor, two concepts of freedom have dominated poliical debae One is that
freedom consists of the absence of government restraint; you are free to travel to France if the
government doesn't prevent you from doing so. The other understanding of freedom is that it
consists of the power to do something; you are free to travel to France if you have the means t go.
The first implies a minimal government and is the one most often embraced by conservatives. The
latter concept is usuallyassociated with activist and interventionist governent.
School choie has turned this polhi
and intllema lineup upside down. On this issue, it
is conservatives who are asserting that the legal freedom to attend a private school is insufficient;
government should provide "real freedom," that is, the same means that are ava'lableto the affluent.

Meanwhile, libemals are insisting that the legal freedom to attend private schools is all that govenment should provide; government should not empower parents and children to attend their choice

of schools.
m See supra note 44 and accompanying Table 2; see also supra note 115 and accompanying Table 7.
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with the again-requisite, strict-scrutiny standard; the Miller plaintiffs are worse off in
existing State A than they are at the State B baseline. The condition should be struck
down, even though the plaintif are better off now than without M..C.P. at all. '"The
question"- recall, again- "is whether the condition advances overall social welfare,
and there is no guarantee that this will happen just because it is consented to by the
individual actor ...
By blocking certain bargains between the individual and the state,

it becomes possible to improve overall social welfare."133
IV. CONCLUSION

"Together the religion clauses function to prohibit redistribution, ineither direction,
between religious and nonreligious persons ...
In the days of limited government action,
the somewhat stricter separation of religious and government activities reduced the

possibilities of redistribution," 134writes Epstein, who recall earlier labeled the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions a "second-best," "mop-up doctrine.'1 ' "Now with the
pooling of resources through government ventures, combating redistribution on religious lines is far more difficult, for the benefits and burdens to both groups must be both
identified and measured."13'

The Court has identified and measured the benefits and burdens of such redistribution in the establishment-clause cases ofMueller,Witers, and ZobrestWl in a way favorable to the individual rights of the religious. Landmark's case provides the opportunity
to as equally favor the individual tights of the religious in the free-exercise context-

'SSee supra noe 46 and accompanying text (quoting ESEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 101).
'SEPMTEN, BARGAINING, supranote 4, at 265; see Epstein, Foreword,supranote 4, at 87.
'SSee supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
'EPM

IN, BARGAINING, supra note 4, at 265; see Epstein,Foreword,supra note 4, at 87. See also Epstein,

Religiou s Liberty inthe Welfare State, sapra note 103, at375 ("some fraction of [the] constant stream of legislation
wilposeachallenge, if not ath
tothe autonomy of religious insinitiom") . ContraAnitaLAlenAlive andWell:
ReligiousFreedomin the Welfare State, 31 WM & MARY L REV. 409,409 (1990) ("becase Epstein's well-known
libertarian interpretaions fliberty, property and contract point souncompomisingly in the direction othe minimal
night watchmm state, the traditional aspects of his perspective [on religioul liberty] prove equally radical as welr)
(footnote onited); Bruce Fein, Threat to Religious Liberty by the Welfare State: An Illusion,31 WM& & MARY L
REV. 423,423 (1990) ("[rlefigious institutions and religious adherents enjoy sufficient political clout to forestall the
hypothesized evils Epstein depics" and "the federal judiciary is eminently capiable of drawing constitutional lines
that protect against religious opprssion, even if those demarcations are not theoretically pure") Charles H. Koch,
Jr.,
CooperativeSurplus: The Efficiency Justifwationfor Active Govenment, 31 WMh& MARY L REV. 431, 431
(1990) ("Epstein's zeal for economic freedom ignores the very purpose of our jouiing together into a cooperative
society")1
See supra I I.B.2.&. (notes 118-126 and accompanying text).
'

See supranotes 73-98, 113-17, and accompanying text.
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again, as in Sherbert,Hobbie, Thomas, and Frazee"3 (the strict-scrutiny, compellinginterest reasoning of which is now, post-R.RA.,"3 restored by statute). A government
venture, like Wisconsin's MYP.CP. school-choice program, bargaining in a way so as to
condition the giving of aid from its pool of resources to eligible parents on the effective
waiver in return of their free-exercise right to send their children to sectarian schools is
an unconstitutional redistribution on religious lines to be combated.
To the barricades, then. With mops."4

See supra § MA.2.b. (notes 107-12 and accompanying text).
'

See sipra note 48 and acompanying text.
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